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Abstract. A delegation scheme allows a computationally weak client
to use a server’s resources to help it evaluate a complex circuit without
leaking any information about the input (other than its length) to the
server. In this paper, we consider delegation schemes for quantum cir-
cuits, where we try to minimize the quantum operations needed by the
client. We construct a new scheme for delegating a large circuit family,
which we call ”C+P circuits”. ”C+P” circuits are the circuits composed
of Toffoli gates and diagonal gates. Our scheme is non-interactive, re-
quires very little quantum computation from the client (proportional to
input length but independent of the circuit size), and can be proved se-
cure in the quantum random oracle model, without relying on additional
assumptions, such as the existence of fully homomorphic encryption. In
practice the random oracle can be replaced by an appropriate hash func-
tion or block cipher, for example, SHA-3, AES.
This protocol allows a client to delegate the most expensive part of some
quantum algorithms, for example, Shor’s algorithm. The previous proto-
cols that are powerful enough to delegate Shor’s algorithm require either
many rounds of interactions or the existence of FHE. The protocol re-
quires asymptotically fewer quantum gates on the client side compared
to running Shor’s algorithm locally.
To hide the inputs, our scheme uses an encoding that maps one input
qubit to multiple qubits. We then provide a novel generalization of clas-
sical garbled circuits (”reversible garbled circuits”) to allow the compu-
tation of Toffoli circuits on this encoding. We also give a technique that
can support the computation of phase gates on this encoding.
To prove the security of this protocol, we study key dependent mes-
sage(KDM) security in the quantum random oracle model. KDM security
was not previously studied in quantum settings.
Keywords: Quantum Computation Delegation· Quantum Cryptogra-
phy· Garbled Circuit· Quantum Random Oracle· KDM Security
1 Introduction
In computation delegation, there is a client holding secret data ϕ and the de-
scription of circuit C that it wants to apply, but it doesn’t have the ability to
⋆ Supported in part by NSF awards IIS-1447700 and AF-1763786
compute C(ϕ) itself. A delegation protocol allows the client to compute C(ϕ)
with the help from a more computationally powerful server. The delegation is
private if the server cannot learn anything about the input ϕ during the proto-
col. After some communications, the client can decrypt the response from the
server and get the computation result (see Figure 1.) This problem is important
in the quantum setting: it’s likely that quantum computers, when they are built,
will be expensive, and made available as a remote service. If a client wants to do
some quantum computation on secret data, a quantum computation delegation
protocol is needed.
description of circuit C
ϕ
Client
(Quantum)
Server
C(ϕ) Nothing about ϕ can
be retrieved (efficiently)
Fig. 1. An illustration for computation delegation
Delegation of computation is a central problem in modern cryptography, and
has been studied for a long time in classical settings. Related works include
multiparty computation, fully homomorphic encryption(FHE), etc. In the study
of delegation, there are two key aspects: privacy and authenticity. This paper
will focus on privacy.
We want the delegation protocol to be useful, efficient and secure. Previous
work falls into two classes: some protocols have information-theoretical security,
but they either can only support a small circuit class or require huge client side
quantum resources (including quantum memories, quantum gates and quantum
communications); other protocols rely on classical fully homomorphic encryp-
tion(FHE). This raises the following question:
Is it possible to delegate quantum computation for a large circuit family, with
small amount of quantum resources on the client side, without assuming
classical FHE?
In the classical world, Yao’s garbled circuit answers this question. Garbled circuit
is also a fundamental tool in many other cryptographic tasks, like multiparty
computation and functional encryption.
Note When designing quantum cryptographic protocols, one factor that we care
about is the ”quantum resources” on the client side. The ”quantum resources”
can be defined as the sum of the cost of the following: (1)the size of quantum
memory that the client needs; (2)the number of quantum gates that the client
needs to apply; (3)the quantum communication that the client needs to make.
Note that if the input (or computation, communication) is partly quantum and
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partly classical, we only consider the quantum part. Since the classical part is
usually much easier to implement than the quantum part, as long as the classical
part is polynomial, it’s reasonable to ignore it and only consider the complexity
of quantum resources. And we argue that it’s better to consider the ”client
side quantum resources” instead of considering only the quantum memory size
or quantum gates: on the one hand, we do not know which type of quantum
computers will survive in the future, so it’s better to focus on the cost estimate
that is invariant to them; on the other hand, there may be some way to compose
the protocol with other protocols to reduce the memory size, or simplify the gate
set.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper we develop a non-interactive (1 round) quantum computation del-
egation scheme for ”C+P circuits”, the circuits composed of Toffoli gates and
diagonal gates. We prove the following:
Theorem 1. It’s possible to delegate C+P circuits non-interactively in the quan-
tum random oracle model, and the client side quantum resources are O(κNq)
CNOT gates, where κ is the secret key length, Nq is the number of qubits in the
input. What’s more, its security can be proved when we choose κ = η + 4Nq
where η is the security parameter.
We will give a more formal statement for it in Section 6. And we conjecture a
better security proof exists when κ = η:
Conjecture 1. For the protocol mentioned above, it’s secure when we choose
κ = η where η is the security parameter.
We argue that our protocol is important for three reasons: (1)The client
only needs small quantum resources. Here we say ”small” to mean the quantum
resources only depend on the key length and the input size, and is independent
of the circuit size. (2)It is based on the quantum random oracle model, without
assuming some trapdoor one-way function. Many protocols before, for example,
[11][14] are based on classical FHE and therefore rely on some kinds of lattice
cryptographic assumptions, for example, LWE assumption. Our protocol is based
on the quantum random oracle (therefore based on hash functions in practice),
and this provides an alternative, incomparable assumption on which we can base
the security of quantum delegation. (3)Our protocol introduces some new ideas
and different techniques, which may be useful in the study of other problems.
Our protocol can be applied to Shor’s algorithm. The hardest part of Shor’s
algorithm is the Toffoli part applied on quantum states, so the client can use
this protocol securely with the help of a remote quantum server.
Corollary 1. It’s possible to delegate Shor’s algorithm within one round of com-
munication, where the client side quantum resources are only quasi-linear quan-
tum gates plus O(κn) CNOT gates.
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Our protocol is closely related to the concept of key-dependent message(KDM)
security. As a side product, we study KDM security in the quantum random
oracle model. As far as we know, we are the first to study this problem. We
point out that although there already exists classical KDM secure encryption
scheme in the random oracle model[5], the security in the quantum random
oracle model still needs an explicit proof. We provide such a proof in this paper.
Furthermore, we generalize KDM security to the quantum KDM security, and
construct a protocol for it in the quantum random oracle model.
1.2 Related Work
To delegate quantum computation, people raised the concepts of blind quantum
computation[7] and quantum homomorphic encryption(QHE)[8]. These two con-
cepts are a little different but closely related: in quantum homomorphic encryp-
tion, no interaction is allowed and the circuits to be evaluated are known by the
server. While in blind quantum computation, interactions are usually allowed
and the circuits are usually only known by the client.
The concept of blind quantum computation was first raised in [3]. And [7]
gave a universal blind quantum computation protocol, based on measurement-
based quantum computation(MBQC)[17]. What’s more, secure assisted quantum
computation based on quantum one-time pad(QOTP) technique was raised in
[9], with which we can easily apply Clifford gates securely but T gates are hard
to implement and require interactions.
Quantum homomorphic encryption is the homomorphic encryption for quan-
tum circuits. Based on QOTP and classical FHE, [8] studied the quantum ho-
momorphic encryption for circuits with low T gate complexity. Later [11] con-
structed a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme for polynomial size circuits.
But it still requires some quantum computing ability on the client side to pre-
pare the evaluation gadgets, and the size of gadgets is propotional to the number
of T gates. Recently Mahadev constructed a protocol[14], which achieves fully
quantum homomorphic encryption, and what makes this protocol amazing is
that the client can be purely classical, which hugely reduces the burden on the
client side.
Another viewpoint of these protocols is the computational assumptions needed.
With interactions, we can do blind quantum computation for universal quantum
circuits information theoretically(IT-) securely. But for non-interactive proto-
cols, [24] gave a limit for IT-secure QHE, which implies IT-secure quantum FHE
is impossible. But it’s still possible to design protocols for some non-universal
circuit families.[13] gave a protocol for IQP circuits, and [23] gave a protocol for
circuit with logarithmic number of T gates.
On the other hand, [8][11][14] rely on classical FHE. The current construc-
tions of classical FHE are all based on various kinds of lattice-based cryptosys-
tems, and the most standard assumption is the Learning-With-Error(LWE) as-
sumption.
Table 1 compares different protocols for quantum computation delegation.
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Protocol Circuit class Client’s quantum resources Assumption
QOTP[9] Clifford O(Nq) Pauli operations -
[7] All
O(L)
Rounds: Circuit Depth
-
[14] All O(Nq) Pauli operations FHE
[13] IQP O(Nq) -
[23]
Clifford+small
number of T gates
Exponential in the number of T gates -
This paper C+P
O(ηNq)(Conjectured)
O(ηNq +N
2
q )(Proved)
CNOT operations
Quantum
ROM
Table 1. L is the number of gates in the circuits, Nq is the number of qubits in the
input, η is the security parameter.
1.3 Techniques
A different encoding for hiding quantum states with classical keys In
many previous protocols, the client hides a quantum state using ”quantum one
time pad”: ρ→ XaZb(ρ), where a, b are two classical strings. After taking average
on a, b, the encrypted state becomes a completely mixed state. In our protocol,
we use the following mapping to hide quantum states, which maps one qubit in
the plaintext to κ qubits in the ciphertext:
Etk0,k1 : |0〉 → |k0〉 , |1〉 → |k1〉
where k0, k1 are chosen uniformly at random in {0, 1}κ and distinct.
We can prove for all possible input states, if we apply this operator on each
qubit, after taking average on all the possible keys, the final results will be
exponentially close to the completely mixed state.
Reversible garbled circuits The main ingredient in our construction is ”re-
versible garbled circuit”. In the usual construction of Yao’s garbled table, the
server can feed the input keys into the garbled table, and get the output keys;
then in the decoding phase, it uses an output mapping to map the keys to the
result. This well-studied classical construction does not work for quantum states.
Even if the original circuit is reversible, the evaluation of Yao’s garbled circuit
is not! To use it on quantum states, besides the original garbled table, we add
another table from the output keys to the input keys. This makes the whole
scheme reversible, which means we can use it on quantum states and the com-
putation result won’t be entangled with auxiliary qubits. For security, we remove
the output mappings. In the context of delegation, these are kept by the client.
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|kin〉
kin Garbled Table kout
kin Backward Table kout
|kout〉
Fig. 2. Reversible garbled table
Note The proof of security of this scheme is subtle. The extra information in-
cluded to allow the reversible computation introduces encryption cycles among
the keys. We address the problem by studying key-dependent message security
in the quantum setting. We show that a KDM-secure encryption scheme exists
in the quantum random oracle model, and use this result to prove the security
of our reversible garbled circuit construction.
Phase gates The reversible garbled circuit allows evaluating Toffoli circuits. To
handle phase gates, instead of applying |kin〉 → |kout〉, we can make the garbled
table implement the following transformation(where m is chosen randomly):
|k0〉 → |k0〉 |m〉 , |k1〉 → |k1〉 |m+ 1〉 (1)
Then the server can apply a ”qudit Z gate”
∑
i ω
i
n |i〉 〈i| (define ωn := e
iπ/n)
on the second register, where i ∈ Zn goes through all the integers in Zn.(This
operation can be done efficiently.) This will give us:
|k0〉 → ω
m
n |k0〉 |m〉 , |k1〉 → ω
m+1
n |k1〉 |m+ 1〉
Then it applies (1) again to erase the second register. After removing the global
phase the result is the same as the output of applying a phase gate RZ(
π
n ) =
|0〉 〈0|+ ωn |1〉 〈1|.
1.4 Organisation
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some background for this
paper. In Section 3 we discuss the encoding scheme. In Section 4 we give our
construction of the quantum computation delegation protocol for C+P circuits.
In Section 5 we prove the security of classical KDM secure scheme in the quan-
tum random oracle model, as the preparation for the security proof of the main
protocol. Then in Section 6 we discuss the security of our protocol. Section 7.1
turns this delegation scheme to a fully blind protocol, Section 7.2 adds interac-
tions into the protocol, and Section 7.3 shows how to use our protocol on Shor’s
algorithm. Section 8 generalizes KDM security to quantum settings, constructs
a quantum KDM secure protocol and proves its security. Then we discuss the
open questions and complete this paper.
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2 Definitions and Preliminaries
2.1 Basics of Quantum Computation
In this section we give a simple introduction for quantum computing, and clarify
some notations in this paper. For more detailed explanations, we refer to [15].
In quantum computing, a pure state is described by a unit vector in a Hilbert
space. A qubit, or a quantum bit, in a pure state, can be described by a vector
|ϕ〉 ∈ C2. The symbols |·〉 and 〈·| are called Dirac symbols. A qudit is described
by a vector |ϕ〉 ∈ Cd.
But a quantum system isn’t necessarily in a pure state. When the quantum
system is open, we need to consider mixed states. To describe both pure and
mixed states, the state of a qubit is described by a density matrix in C2×2. A
density matrix is a trace-one positive semidefinite complex matrix. The density
matrix that corresponds to pure state |ϕ〉 is |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|, and we abbreviate it as ϕ.
For an n-qubit state, its density matrix is in C2
n×2n . The space of density
operators in system S is denoted as D(S). Note that we use E for the notation
of the expectation value.
A quantum operation on pure states can be described by a unitary trans-
form |ϕ〉 → U |ϕ〉. And an operation on mixed states can be described by a
superoperator ρ→ E(ρ) = trR(U(ρ⊗|0〉 〈0|)U †)). We use calligraphic characters
like D, E to denote superoperators, and use the normal characters like U,D to
denote unitary transforms. We also use Sans-serif font like X,Z,Et to denote
quantum operations: When they are used as Et |ϕ〉 they mean unitary opera-
tions(applied on Dirac symbols without parentheses), and when used as Et(ρ)
they mean superoperators.
The quantum gates include X, Y, Z, CNOT, H, T, Toffoli and so on. What’s
more, denote RZ(θ) = |0〉 〈0|+ eiθ |1〉 〈1|, where i is the imaginary unit. Denote
ωn = e
iπ/n, we can write RZ(kπ/n) = |0〉 〈0|+ωkn |1〉 〈1|. Since the i will be used
as the symbol for indexes and ”inputs”, we avoid using eiπ/n in this paper, and
use ωn instead.
A gate is a diagonal gate if in its matrix representation all the non-zero terms
are on its diagonal.
The trace distance of two quantum states is defined as ∆(ρ, σ) = 12 |ρ− σ|tr,
where | · |tr is the trace norm.
2.2 Basics of Cryptography
A quantum symmetric key encryption scheme contains three mappings: KeyGen(1κ)→
sk, Encsk : D(M)→ D(C), Decsk : D(C)→ D(M).[16]
In this paper, we need to use the verifiable symmetric key encryption scheme,
which contains four mappings: KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Ver. The scheme has a key
verification procedure Ver : K × D(C)→ {⊥, 1}.
A verifiable quantum symmetric key encryption scheme is correct if:
1. ∀ρ ∈ D(R⊗ S), Esk←KeyGen(1κ) |(I⊗ Decsk)((I ⊗ Encsk)(ρ)) − ρ|tr = negl(κ)
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2. ∀ρ ∈ D(R⊗ S), Prsk←KeyGen(1κ)(Ver(sk, (I⊗ Encsk)(ρ)) =⊥) = negl(κ),
and Prsk←KeyGen(1κ),r←KeyGen(1κ)(Ver(r, (I⊗ Encsk)(ρ)) = 1) = negl(κ)
Here the encryption and decryption are all on system S, and R is the reference
system.
Sometimes we also need to encrypt the messages with multiple keys, and
require that (informally) an adversary can only get the message if it knows all
the keys. In a verifiable symmetric multi-key encryption scheme, KeyGen(1κ) is
the same as the symmetric single-key scheme, Enck1,k2,···ki encrypts a message
under keys K = (k1, k2, · · · ki), Deck1,k2,···ki decrypts a ciphertext given all the
keys k1, k2, · · · ki, and Ver(k, i, c)→ {⊥, 1} verifies whether k is the i-th key used
in the encryption of c.
The next problem is to define ”secure” formally. The concept of indistin-
guishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) was introduced in [4][12].
Let’s first review the security definitions in the classical case.
Definition 1. For a symmetric key encryption scheme, consider the following
game, called ”IND-CPA game”, between a challenger and an adversary A :
1. The challenger runs KeyGen(1κ)→ sk and samples b←r {0, 1}.
2. The adversary gets the following oracle, whose input space is M:
(a) The adversary chooses m ∈M, and sends it into the oracle.
(b) If b = 1, the oracle outputs Enc(m). If b = 0, it outputs Enc(0|m|).
3. The adversary tries to guess b with some distinguisher D. Denote the guess-
ing result as b′.
The distinguishing advantage is defined by AdvIND−CPA(A , κ) = |Pr(b′ = 1|b =
1)− Pr(b′ = 1|b = 0)|.
Definition 2. We say a protocol is IND-CPA secure against quantum adver-
saries if for any BQP adversary A which can run quantum circuits as the dis-
tinguisher, there exists a negligible function negl such that AdvIND−CPA(A , κ) =
negl(κ).
Note that the ”IND-CPA security against quantum adversaries” characterizes
the security of a protocol against an adversary who has the quantum computing
ability in the distinguishing phase but can only run the protocol classically.
A related concept is key dependent message (KDM) security, which was raised
in [5] and developed in several papers[2].
Definition 3. The KDM-CPA game is defined similar to the IND-CPA game,
except that (1)in the first step the challenger runs KeyGen(1κ) for N times to
generate K = {ski}i∈[N ], N is less than a polynomial of the security parame-
ter.(2)the client is allowed to query the encryption oracle with a function f ∈ F ,
a message m, and an index i of the keys, and the encryption oracle returns
Encski(f(K,m)) or Encski(0
|f(K,m)|), depending on b. Note that the outputs of
functions in F should be fixed-length, otherwise |f(K,m)| is not well-defined.
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A classical KDM secure encryption scheme was constructed and proven secure
in the classical random oracle model in [5].
For quantum cryptographic schemes, we need the concept of ”qIND-CPA”
security raised in [8].
Definition 4. For a symmetric key encryption scheme, consider the following
game, called ”qIND-CPA game”, between a challenger and an adversary A :
1. The challenger runs KeyGen(1κ)→ sk and samples b←r {0, 1}.
2. The adversary gets the following oracle, whose input space is D(M):
(a) The adversary chooses ρ ∈ D(M⊗R). The adversary sends system M
to the oracle, and keeps R as the reference system.
(b) If b = 1, the oracle applies Enc on M and sends it to the adversary. The
adversary will hold the state (Enc ⊗ I)(ρ). If b = 0, the oracle encrypts
0|m| and the adversary gets (Enc⊗ I)(0|m|⊗ ρR), where ρR is the density
operator of subsystem R.
3. The adversary tries to guess b with some distinguisher D. Denote the guess-
ing output as b′.
The distinguishing advantage is defined by AdvqIND−CPA(A , κ) = |Pr(b′ =
1|b = 1)− Pr(b′ = 1|b = 0)|.
Definition 5. A protocol is qIND-CPA secure if for any BQP adversary A
which can make polynomial queries to the oracle, there exists a negligible function
negl such that AdvqIND−CPA(A , κ) = negl(κ).
What’s more, we call it one-shot qIND-CPA secure if the adversary is only
allowed to query the encryption oracle once.
In the definition of qIND-CPA security, the adversary can query the encryption
oracle with quantum states, and it can also run a quantum distinguisher.
2.3 Blind Quantum Computation and Quantum Homomorphic
Encryption
We compare two similar concepts in this subsection: quantum homomorphic
encryption and blind quantum computation. For reference, we cite [3][7][8].
Some blind quantum computation protocols are interactive. For quantum ho-
momorphic encryption, interaction is not allowed. If we focus on non-interactive
protocols, the difference of quantum homomorphic encryption and blind quan-
tum computation is which party knows the circuit: in blind quantum computa-
tion, the circuit is only known by the client but not the server; in homomorphic
encryption, the circuit is known by the server but not necessarily known by the
client. In our paper, we use ”delegation of quantum computation” to mean in
our original protocol, the circuit is known by both parties.
A non-interactive blind quantum computation protocol BQC on circuit family
F = {Fn} contains 4 mappings:
BQC.KeyGen(1κ, 1N , 1L) → (sk): The key generation algorithm takes the key
length κ, input length N and circuit length L and returns the secret key.
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BQC.Encsk : D(M) × F → D(C). Given the encryption key and the circuit in
F = ∪{Fn}, this algorithm maps inputs to ciphertexts.
BQC.Eval : D(C) → D(C′). This algorithm maps ciphertexts to some other
ciphertexts, following the instructions which may be contained in C.
BQC.Decsk : D(C′) → D(M′). This algorithm decrypts the ciphertexts and
stores the outputs in M.
Here we put N,L into the KeyGen algorithm, which are needed in our protocol.
In quantum computation delegation, the definition of encryption is replaced by
EncCsk : D(M) → D(C), and the evaluation is replaced by Eval
C . This means C
is known to both parties.
2.4 Garbled Table
We make a simple introduction of Yao’s garbled table [22] here.
Garbled table is a powerful technique for the randomized encoding of func-
tions. When constructing the garbled circuit of some circuit C, the client picks
two keys for each wire, and denotes them as kwb , where b ∈ {0, 1}, and w is the
index of the wire.
The garbled table is based on a verifiable symmetric key encryption scheme.
For gate g, suppose its input wires are w1, w2, and the output wire is v. The
client constructs the following table:
Enckw1
0
,k
w2
0
(kvg(0,0)) (2)
Enckw1
0
,k
w2
1
(kvg(0,1)) (3)
Enckw1
1
,k
w2
0
(kvg(1,0)) (4)
Enckw1
1
,k
w2
1
(kvg(1,1)) (5)
And it picks a random permutation in S4 to shuffle them.
If the server is given the garbled table for some gate, and given a pair of
input keys, it can evaluate the output keys: it can try each row in the garbled
table and see whether the given keys pass the verification. If they pass, use them
to decrypt this row and get the output keys.
By providing the input keys and the garbled table for each gate in the circuit,
the server can evaluate the output keys for the whole circuit. And in the ran-
domized encoding problem the client also provides the mapping from the output
keys to the corresponding values on some wires: kwb → b, for some set of ws.
The server can know the output values on these revealed wires, but the values
on other wires are hidden. This construction has wide applications in classical
world, for example, it allows an NC0 client to delegate the evaluation of a circuit
to the server.
2.5 Quantum Random Oracle Model
A classical random oracle is an oracle which all parties can query, returns inde-
pendent random value for different inputs, and returns fixed value for the same
input. In practice, a random oracle is usually replaced by a hash function.
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A quantum random oracle is a random oracle that allows the user to query
it with quantum states. It can do the map H : |a〉 |b〉 → |a〉 |H(a)⊕ b〉. The
quantum random oracle was studied in several papers[6][21].
This paper focuses on the quantum cryptographic protocols in the quantum
random oracle model, and does not assume any ”trapdoor function”. What’s
more, in our proof, the random oracle doesn’t need to be programmable.
3 The Encoding For Hiding Quantum States With
Classical Keys
Let’s first discuss the encoding operator, Et, to ”hide” the quantum states. For
each qubit in the input, the client picks two random different keys k0, k1 ∈ {0, 1}κ
and encodes the input qubit with the following operator:
Etk0,k1 : |0〉 → |k0〉 , |1〉 → |k1〉
The dimensions of two sides are not the same, but we can add some auxiliary
qubits on the left side. As long as k0, k1 are distinct, this operator is unitary.
For pure quantum state |ϕ〉 =
∑
αi1i2···iN |i1i2 · · · iN 〉, given key set K =
{kni }, where n ∈ [N ], i ∈ {0, 1}, if we apply this operator on each qubit, using
keys {kn0 , k
n
1 } for the n-th qubit, we get:
EtK |ϕ〉 =
∑
αi1i2···in |k
(1)
i1
k
(2)
i2
· · · k
(N)
in
〉
The following lemma shows that if the keys are long enough, chosen randomly
and kept secret, this encoding is statistically secure, in other words, the mixed
state after we take average on all the possible keys, is close to the completely
mixed state with exponentially small distance:
Lemma 1. Suppose ρ ∈ D(S ⊗ R), S = (C2)⊗N . Suppose we apply the Et
operation on system S with key length κ, after taking average on all the valid
keys, we get
σ =
1
(2κ(2κ − 1))N
∑
∀n∈[N ],kn
0
,kn
1
∈{0,1}κ,kn
0
6=kn
1
(EtS{kn
i
} ⊗ I)(ρ)
then we have ∆(σ, ( 12κN I)⊗ trS(ρ)) ≤ (
1
2 )
κ−4N
We put the detailed proof in the appendix.
Since Et is a unitary mapping, given K and EtK(ρ), we can apply the inverse
of Et and get ρ: Et−1K (EtK(ρ)) = ρ. Note that when applying Et we enlarge the
space by appending auxiliary qubits, and when applying Et−1 we remove these
auxiliary qubits.
Fact 1 Et can be implemented with only CNOT operations.
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Proof. First implement mapping |0〉 → |0κ〉 , |1〉 → |k0 ⊕ k1〉. This can be done
by CNOT the input into the places where k0 ⊕ k1 has bit value 1. Then apply X
gates on the places where k0 has bit value 1. This will xor k0 into these registers
and complete the mapping |0〉 → |k0〉 , |1〉 → |k1〉.
The quantum computation delegation protocol that we will discuss in the next
section will use this encoding.
4 A Quantum Computation Delegation Protocol for
C+P Circuits
In this section, we use Et encoding and a new technique called ”reversible garbled
circuit” to design a quantum computation delegation protocol.
4.1 C+P Circuits and the Relation to Toffoli Depth
[19] defined ”almost classical” circuits. Here we rename it to ”C+P” circuits,
abbreviating ”classical plus phase”.
Definition 6 ([19]). C+P is the family of quantum circuits which are composed
of Toffoli gates and diagonal gates.
We can prove it’s possible to decompose this type of circuits into simpler gates.
We put the proof in the appendix.
Proposition 1. Any C+P circuit can be decomposed to Toffoli gates and single
qubit phase gates. Furthermore, it can be approximated by Toffoli gates and single
qubit phase gates of the form RZ(
π
n ) = |0〉 〈0|+ ωn |1〉 〈1| , n ∈ N+, where ωn is
the nth root of unity. To approximate a circuit of length L of Toffoli gates and
single qubit phase gates to precision ǫ, we only need Toffoli gates and phase gates
in the form of RZ(
π
2d
), d ∈ [D], where D = Θ(log Lǫ ).
We consider D as a fixed value in this paper. Since ǫ depends exponentially on
D, a small D in practice should be enough and it will at most add a logarithmic
term in the complexity.
{C+P,H} is a complete basis for quantum circuits. Our work implies a delega-
tion scheme whose round complexity equals the H-depth of a given circuit. Previ-
ous works on quantum computation delegation generally focused on {Clifford, T}
basis. (The exception is [13], which works for IQP circuits.) With the exception
of Mahadev’s FHE-based scheme[14], their complexity of client side quantum
gates increases with the circuit’s T-depth.
As far as we know, there is no general way to transform a Toffoli circuit into
the {Clifford, T} basis such that its T depth is smaller than the Toffoli depth
of the original ciruit, without blowing up the circuit width exponentially. We
formalize this statement as a conjecture:
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Conjecture 2. For any polynomial time algorithm that transforms Toffoli circuits
into the {Clifford, T} basis, there exists a sequence of inputs for which the
algorithm’s outputs have T depth Ω(d), where d denotes the Toffoli depths of
the original circuits.
Working with the {C+P, H} basis allows us to design efficient protocols for
delegating Shor’s algorithm (which has low H-depth). Previously, this was only
possible using FHE-based schemes.
4.2 Protocol Construction
The idea comes from Yao’s Garbled Circuit construction. We have discussed the
construction in section 2.4. The garbled circuit construction is commonly used
for randomized encodings, but we find it can be revised for quantum computation
delegation. Let’s first discuss the ideas briefly.
If we try to use the garbled table construction on a quantum circuit, the
first problem is: the classical garbled circuit is not reversible, so it’s not possible
to use it to implement the quantum operations. But there is a direct fix: when
constructing the garbled tables, instead of just creating one table for each gate,
the client can construct two tables, in one table it encrypts the output keys
with the input keys, and in the other table it encrypts the input keys with the
output keys! This will make the whole garbled circuit reversible, which means,
the garbled circuit mapping can be applied on quantum states unitarily.
But another problem arises: If we simply replace the garbled circuit in the
randomized encoding problem with ”reversible garbled circuit”, it’s not secure
any more. But it turns out, if we remove the output mapping, it becomes se-
cure again, under some reasonable assumptions. And that gives us a delegation
protocol. The full protocol is specified in Protocol 1. Below we give more details.
Toffoli gates: reversible garbled table First recall that in the classical gar-
bled circuit, the evaluation operation on each garbled gate takes the input keys,
decrypts the table and computes the corresponding output keys:
kin → kout
This mapping is classical, and there is a standard way to transform a classi-
cal circuit to a quantum circuit, by introducing auxiliary output registers, and
keeping the input:
U : |kin〉 |c〉
garbled gate
−−−−−−−−→ |kin〉 |kout ⊕ c〉 (6)
We use the second register as the output register, and c is its original value. This
mapping computes the output keys from the garbled table and xors them to the
second register.
This mapping is unitary, and we can also put superpositions on the left-hand
side of (6). However, when it is used directly on quantum states, the inputs and
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outputs will be entangled together. Explicitly, for a specific Toffoli gate, we use
kw1u , k
w2
v , k
w3
w to denote the keys of the input wires w1, w2, w3 which correspond
to the input (u, v, w); for the output part the keys are kv1u , k
v2
v , k
v3
w . If we apply
(6) directly, we get:
U : |kw1u 〉 |k
w2
v 〉 |k
w3
w 〉 |c1〉 |c2〉 |c3〉
→ |kw1u 〉 |k
w2
v 〉 |k
w3
w 〉 |k
v1
u ⊕ c1〉 |k
v2
v ⊕ c2〉 |k
v3
w⊕uv ⊕ c3〉
But what we need is the following mapping:
U : |kw1u 〉 |k
w2
v 〉 |k
w3
w 〉 → |k
v1
u 〉 |k
v2
v 〉 |k
v3
w⊕uv〉 (7)
Which means, we need to disentangle and erase the input registers from the
output registers. Note that, again, both sides should be understood as super-
positions of different keys. And recall that for each Toffoli gate there are eight
possible combinations of input keys, and this mapping should work for all the
eight combinations.
To erase the input from the output, we can use two mappings: |kin〉 |0〉 →
|kin〉 |kout〉 and |kin〉 |kout〉 → |0〉 |kout〉. Both operations have the same form as
equation (6). (For the second step, we could view the kout as the input, kin as c,
and get |kout〉 |kin ⊕ kin〉) So we can use two garbled tables for this ”reversible
garbled table”!
Assume CL is some verifiable multiple key encryption scheme. The client
puts the encryption outputs CL.Enckin(kout) into a table(there are eight rows
in this table), and shuffles them randomly; this is the forward table. And it
puts the encryption outputs CL.Enckout(kin) into a table and shuffles to get the
backward table. This construction will allow the server to implement (7), even
on superpositions of input keys.
We note that we do not need to consider the detailed operations for decrypt-
ing each garbled table, and the existence of such operations comes from quantize
the classical mapping as (6).
For the encoding of the inputs, recall that in the usual garble table construc-
tion, the client encrypts each bit in the inputs with the mapping:
0→ k0, 1→ k1 (8)
To make it quantum, instead of replacing the classical bits with the correspond-
ing keys, the client uses Et operator to hide the inputs. And we notice that (8)
is a special case of Et where the input is classical.
Phase gates Now the protocol works for Toffoli gates. But what if there are
phase gates?
From Proposition 1, we only need to consider the single qubit phase gates in
the form of RZ(
π
n ), n ∈ Z+. Suppose we want to implement such a gate on some
wire, where the keys are k0, k1, corresponding to values 0 and 1, as discussed in
the last subsection.
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To implement RZ(
π
n ), the client first picks a random integerm ∈ Zn. What it
is going to do is to create a table of two rows, put CL.Enck0(m) and CL.Enck1(m+
1) into the table and shuffle it. When the server needs to evaluate RZ(
π
n ), it will
first decrypt the garbled table and write the output on an auxiliary register |0〉.
So it can implement the following transformation:
|k0〉 → |k0〉 |m〉 , |k1〉 → |k1〉 |m+ 1〉 (9)
This step is similar to implementing equation (6).
Then it applies a ”qudit Z gate”
∑
i ω
i
n |i〉 〈i| on the second register, where
i ∈ Zn goes through all the integers in Zn.(This operation can be done efficiently.)
This will give us:
|k0〉 → ω
m
n |k0〉 |m〉 , |k1〉 → ω
m+1
n |k1〉 |m+ 1〉
Then it applies (9) again to erase the second register. After removing the global
phase the result is the same as the output of applying a phase gate RZ(
π
n ) =
|0〉 〈0|+ ωn |1〉 〈1|.
What’s more, since m is chosen randomly the garbled gate won’t reveal the
keys. (This fact is contained in the security proof.)
4.3 Protocol Design
In this section we formalize this garbled circuit based quantum computation
delegation protocol. Let’s call it GBC.
We index the wires in the circuit as follows: If two wires are separated by a
single qubit phase gate, we consider them as the same wire; otherwise (separated
by a Toffoli gate, or disjoint), they are different wires. Suppose we have already
transformed the circuit using Fact 1 so that there is no controlled phase gate.
For a circuit with N input bits and L gates, the number of wires is at most
N + 3L.
Protocol 1 The protocol GBC, with CL being the underlying classical encryption
scheme, for a circuit C which is composed of Toffoli gates and phase gates in
the form of RZ(
π
n ), is defined as:
Key Generation GBC.KeyGen(1κ, 1N , 1L): Sample keys K = (klb),
klb ← CL.KeyGen(1
κ), b ∈ {0, 1}, l ∈ [N + 3L].
Encryption GBC.EncCK(ρ): Output (EtKin(ρ),TAB
C
CL(K)). (Note that with the
reference system, the first part is (I⊗ EtKin)(ρRS).)
Evaluation GBC.EvalC(ρq, tabs): Output EvalTAB
C
CL(ρq, tab(g))
Decryption GBC.DecK(σ): Suppose the output keys in K are Kout. Apply the
map Et−1Kout(·) on σ and return the result.
TABCCL(K) and EvalTAB
C
CL(ρq, tab(g)) appeared in this protocol are defined as
follows:
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Protocol 2 TABCCL(K), where K is the set of keys:
Suppose circuit C is composed of gates (gi)
L
i=1. This algorithm returns (tabgi)
L
i=1,
where tabg is defined as follows:
1. If g is a Toffoli gate: Suppose g has controlled input wires w1, w2 and tar-
get wire w3, and the corresponding output wires are v1, v2, v3. Suppose the
corresponding keys in K are {kwb }, w ∈ {w1, w2, w3, v1, v2, v3}, b ∈ {0, 1}:
Create table1 as follows: For each triple u, v, w ∈ {0, 1}3, add the following
as a row:
CL.Enckw1u ,kw2v ,kw3w (k
v1
u ||k
v2
v ||k
v3
w⊕uv)
and pick a random permutation in S8 to shuffle this table.
Create table2 as follows: For each triple u, v, w ∈ {0, 1}3, add the following
as a row:
CL.Enckv1u ,k
v2
v ,k
v3
w⊕uv
(kw1u ||k
w2
v ||k
w3
w )
and pick another random permutation in S8 to shuffle this table.
Return (table1, table2)
2. If g is a phase gate, Suppose g is a phase gate RZ(
π
n ) on wire w:
Sample m0 ←r Zn, m1 = m0 + 1. Create table1 as follows: For each u ∈
{0, 1}, add the following as a row:
CL.Enckwu (mu)
and pick a random permutation in S2 to shuffle this table.
Return table1.
Protocol 3 EvalTABCCL(ρ, tab):
Suppose circuit C is composed of gates (gi)
L
i=1. For each gate g in C, whose
corresponding garbled gate is tabg in tab:
If g is a Toffoli gate, with input wires w1, w2, w3, output wires v1, v2, v3:
Suppose tabg = (tab1, tab2), where tab1 is the table from input keys to output
keys, and tab2 is from output keys to input keys. Suppose ρ ∈ D(Sg ⊗S ′), where
Sg is the system that is currently storing the keys on the input wires of g, and
S ′ is the remaining systems:
1. Introduce three auxiliary registers and denote the system as S′g. Use tab1 to
apply the following mapping on Sg, as discussed in the section 4.2:
|kw1u 〉 |k
w2
v 〉 |k
w3
w 〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 → |k
w1
u 〉 |k
w2
v 〉 |k
w3
w 〉 |k
v1
u 〉 |k
v2
v 〉 |k
v3
w⊕uv〉
2. Use tab2 to apply the following mapping on Sg ⊗ S ′g, as discussed in the
section 4.2:
|kw1u 〉 |k
w2
v 〉 |k
w3
w 〉 |k
v1
u 〉 |k
v2
v 〉 |k
v3
w⊕uv〉 → |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 |k
v1
u 〉 |k
v2
v 〉 |k
v3
w⊕uv〉
3. Remove system Sg, rename S ′g as Sg. Denote the final state as the new ρ.
If g is a phase gate on wire w in the form of RZ(
π
n ), : Suppose ρ ∈ D(Sg ⊗S
′),
where Sg is the system that stores the keys on the input wire of g, and S′ is the
remaining systems:
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1. Use tabg to implement the mapping |kw〉 |0〉 → |kw〉 |m〉, where m is the
decrypted output.
2. Apply
∑
i ω
i
n |i〉 〈i| on the system of m.
3. Use tabg to implement the mapping |kw〉 |m〉 → |kw〉 |0〉.
The following two theorems summarize its correctness and efficiency:
Theorem 2. Protocol GBC is a correct non-interactive quantum computation
delegation protocol for C+P circuits.
Theorem 3. In GBC protocol, the quantum resources required on the client side
are O(κNq) CNOT gates, where κ stands for the key length used in the protocol,
Nq is the size of quantum states in the input, which are independent of the size
of the circuit.
Here we use Nq instead of N because we want to consider the case where some
part of the input is classical and some part of it is quantum. To make the protocol
secure we may need to choose κ depending on Nq. This is discussed with more
details in Section 6.
This means the quantum resources of this protocol are independent of the cir-
cuit to be evaluated! In practice the size of the circuit may be a large polynomial
of the input size, and our protocol will not be affected by this.
4.4 On the Related Impossibility Results of Quantum Computation
Delegation
There are several impossibility results on the delegation of quantum computa-
tion, for example, [24][1]. [24] gave us a limit on IT-secure QHE, and their result
can be applied to C+P gates. That might make us think that delegation of
quantum computation on C+P gates must rely on trapdoor one-way functions,
but our protocol bypasses the limit in two ways: (1) making the circuit public;
(2) using the quantum random oracle. In practice, these conditions don’t affect
the usability too much; but they lead to something different, and lots of open
questions arise here. (See Section 9 for further discussion.)
5 KDM Security of Classical Encryption against
Quantum Attack
As we can see, in GBC protocol there are encryption cycles. So to make the
protocol secure, for the underlying encryption scheme CL, the usual security
definition is not enough and we need at least KDM security. In this section, we
will first discuss the key dependent message security(KDM security) in quan-
tum world, and give an encryption scheme KDMP that is KDM-secure against
quantum adversaries. These results will be the foundation for the security proof
of the GBC protocol.
In classical world, KDM security was discussed in several papers, for example,
[5][2]. [5] gave a classical KDM secure encryption scheme in the random oracle
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model, and [2] constructed KDM secure protocols in the standard model, based
on some hard problems, for example, Learning-With-Error.
The KDM security can be adaptive, which means, the adversary can make
encryption queries after it receives some ciphertexts. But in our work we only
need to consider the non-adaptive setting. What’s more, we only need to consider
the symmetric key case. To summarize, the game between the adversary and the
challenger can be defined as:
Definition 7 (naSymKDM Game).
The symmetric key non-adaptive KDM game naSymKDM for function family
F against a quantum adversary A in the quantum random oracle model with
parameters (κ, L, T, q) is defined as follows.
1. The challenger chooses bit b ←r {0, 1} and samples K = {ski}Li=1, ski ←
KeyGen(1κ).
2. The adversary and the challenger do the following T times, non-adaptively,
which means, the challenger will only send out the answers in step (b) after
it has received all the queries:
(a) The adversary picks index i, function f ∈ F and message msg ∈ {0, 1}∗,
and sends them to the challenger. The size of msg should be compatible
with f .
(b) If b = 1, the challenger gives c = Encski(f(K,msg)) to the adversary. If
b = 0, the challenger gives c = Encski(0
|f(K,msg)|).
3. The adversary tries to guess b using distinguisher D and outputs b′. Here
D is a quantum operation and can query the oracle with quantum states.
Suppose D will query the random oracle for at most q times.
f can also query the random oracle, and it only makes queries on classical states.
What’s more, the output of functions in F should have a fixed length, otherwise
|f(K,m)| will not be well-defined.
The guessing advantage is defined as AdvnaSymKDMF (A(L,T,q), κ) = |Pr(b
′ =
1|b = 1)− Pr(b′ = 1|b = 0)|.
Definition 8. A symmetric key encryption scheme is nonadaptive KDM secure
for circuit family F against quantum adversaries in the quantum random oracle
model if for any BQP adversary,
Adv
naSymKDM
F (A(L(κ),T (κ),q(κ)), κ) = negl(κ)
Where L(κ), T (κ), q(κ) are polynomial functions that may depend on the adver-
sary.
5.1 A KDM Secure Protocol in the Quantum Random Oracle
Model
In the quantum random oracle model, we can give a construction of the classical
KDM secure encryption scheme KDMP. Here ”classical” means the encryption
and decryption are purely classical. But the distinguisher may query the quan-
tum random oracle in superposition.
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Protocol 4 We can construct a verifiable symmetric KDM secure encryption
scheme KDMP in the quantum random oracle model, where we denote the ran-
dom oracle as H:
KDMP.KeyGen(1κ): Output sk ←r {0, 1}κ
KDMP.Encsk(m): R1, R2 ←r {0, 1}κ, output ciphertext c = (R1,H(sk||R1)⊕m)
and key tag (R2,H(sk||R2))
KDMP.Decsk(c): Output H(sk||c1)⊕ c2, where c1 and c2 are from c = (c1, c2).
KDMP.Ver(k, tag): Suppose tag = (tag1, tag2), output 1 if H(k||tag1) = tag2,
and ⊥ otherwise.
Since the execution of this protocol is classical, the correctness can be proved
classically and is obvious. We refer to [5] here and write it out explicitly for
convenience.
Theorem 4 (Correctness). KDMP is a correct verifiable symmetric key en-
cryption scheme in the quantum random oracle model.
The security under classical random oracle model has been proven. But here we
study the quantum random oracle, so although the protocol is almost the same,
we still need a new proof.
Theorem 5 (Security). Define F [q′] as the set of classical functions that query
the random oracle at most q′ times. For any adversary which can query the
random oracle quantumly at most q times, we have
Adv
naSymKDM
KDMP,F [q′] (A(L,T,q), κ) ≤ poly(q, q
′, L, T )2−0.5κ
where poly is a fixed polynomial.
We put the proof in the appendix.
6 Security of GBC Protocol
In this section we discuss the security of protocol GBC. First we need to construct
a classical encryption scheme CL as its underlying scheme. The construction is
very similar to the KDMP scheme, except that this is multi-key and the KDMP
scheme is single-key. We will use it as the underlying scheme of GBC.
6.1 Construction of the Underlying Classical Encryption Scheme
Protocol 5 The underlying multi-key encryption scheme CL is defined as:
CL.KeyGen(1κ): Output sk ←r {0, 1}κ
CL.Enck1,k2,k3(m): R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 ←r {0, 1}
κ, output
(R1, R2, R3,H(k1||R1)⊕H(k2||R2)⊕H(k3||R3)⊕m), (10)
((R4,H(k1||R4)), (R5,H(k2||R5)), (R6,H(k3||R6))) (11)
where H is the quantum random oracle.
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CL.Deck1,k2,k3(c): Suppose c = (R1, R2, R3, c4). Output (H(k1||R1)⊕H(k2||R2)⊕
H(k3||R3)⊕ c4).
CL.Ver(k, i, c): Suppose the ith key tag in c is tagi = (Ri, r). Output 1 if r =
H(k||Ri), and ⊥ otherwise.
We choose not to define and discuss the security of this scheme, but use it as
a ”wrapper” of the KDMP scheme. In the security proof we will ”unwrap” its
structure and base the proof on the security of KDMP scheme.
6.2 Security of GBC against Classical or Quantum Attack
In this subsection we give the security statements of GBC. First, we can show,
when used on classical inputs, GBCCL is secure:
Proposition 2. GBCCL, where CL is defined as Protocol 5, is one-shot IND-
CPA secure against quantum adversary in the quantum random oracle model.
Explicitly, if the distinguisher that the adversary uses makes at most q queries
to the quantum random oracle, the input size is N and the size of circuit C is
L,
AdvIND−CPA
GBCC
CL
(A , κ) ≤ poly(q,N, L)2−0.5κ
Where poly is a fixed polynomial that does not depend on A or the parameters.
The detailed proof is in the appendix.
But we meet some difficulty when we try to prove the qIND-CPA security.
We leave it as a conjecture:
Conjecture 3. GBCCL is one-shot qIND-CPA secure in the quantum random or-
acle model.
But if we use a bigger key length, we can prove its security.
Theorem 6. Suppose Nq is the size of quantum states in the input, then GBCCL
is one-shot qIND-CPA secure, in the quantum random oracle model when we take
κ ≥ 4Nq and consider η = κ − 4Nq as the security parameter, where κ is the
key length. In other words, for any BQP adversary A , there exists a negligible
function negl:
Adv
qIND−CPA
GBCCL
(A , κ) = negl(κ− 4Nq)
Although we don’t have a proof for Conjecture 3, we conjecture it is true, since
this protocol seems to be a very natural generalization from classical to quantum.
We leave it as an open problem. The main obstacle here is its security cannot be
reduced to the semantic security of classical garbled circuits easily: the adversary
gets many superpositions of keys. We have to prove it using different techniques,
which leads to Theorem 6.
From Theorem 6 we know when we take κ ≥ 4Nq and consider κ − 4Nq as
the security parameter the security has been proved. So when L = ω(N2q ) the
quantum resources for the client to run this protocol are smaller than running
the circuit itself anyway.
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What’s more, we claim that this protocol is still secure when we replace
the random oracle with practical hash functions or symmetric key encryption
schemes:
Conjecture 4. When we replace the quantum random oracle in GBCCL with prac-
tical hash functions or symmetric key encryption schemes, like the SHA-3 or
AES, the security statements still hold.
6.3 Security Proof
IND-CPA security of Protocol 1 The proof of Proposition 2 is postponed
into the appendix. The proof is based on Theorem 5, which is about KDM
security of Protocol 4. The structure of our scheme, when used classically, can
be seen as a special case of the KDM function. But the definition of IND-CPA
security for protocol GBC is still different from the KDM game security: in GBC
we are trying to say the inputs of Et are hidden, but KDM security is about the
encrypted messages in the garbled table. So it doesn’t follow from the security
of KDMP protocol trivially.
Discussions of qIND-CPA To prove Theorem 6, we use a different secu-
rity proof technique, which enables us to base the qIND-CPA advantage on the
IND-CPA advantage and a classical ”hard-to-compute” lemma. This technique
enables us to argue about the security of a quantum protocol using only security
results in the classical settings.
We need to prove the keys that are not ”revealed” are ”hard to compute”.
Then we expand the expression of the qIND-CPA advantage, write it as the sum
of exponential number of terms and we can observe that their forms are the
same as the probability of ”computing the unrevealed keys”. We can prove these
terms are all exponentially small, thus we get a bound for the whole expression.
Lemma 2. For any C+P circuit C, |C| = L, any adversary that uses distin-
guisher D which can query the quantum random oracle q times (either with
classical or quantum inputs), given the reversible garbled table and input keys
corresponding to one input, it’s hard to compute the input keys corresponding to
other input. Formally, for any i 6= j, |ϕi〉, we have
EK ER tr((EtK |j〉)
†D(EtK(|i〉 〈i|)⊗ ϕi ⊗ TAB
C
CL(K,R))(EtK |j〉))
≤ poly(q,N, L)2−0.5κ (12)
where poly is a fixed polynomial that does not depend on A or the parameters,
N is the size of inputs, and R denotes the randomness used in the computation
of TABCCL(K), including the random oracle outputs, the random paddings and
the random shuffling. And TABCCL(K,R) is the output of TAB
C
CL(K) using ran-
domness R, and since R is given as a parameter there will be no randomness
inside.
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Note that since we have already fixed all the randomness, TABCCL(K,R) is pure.
We also note that this can be seen as a classical lemma since |i〉, |j〉 are all in
computational basis. We postpone the proof into supplementary materials.
Let’s prove Theorem 6 from Proposition 2 and Lemma 2. We will expand the
the expression of the input state and qIND-CPA advantage, and each term in
the cross terms can be bounded by (12).
Proof (of Theorem 6). First, suppose the state that the adversary uses is |ϕ〉 =∑
i ci |i〉 |ϕi〉, where i is in the input system, i ∈ I where I is the set of non-zero
term(ci 6= 0), |I| ≤ 2Nq and |ϕi〉 is in the reference system. We can only consider
pure states since we can always purify mixed states with a reference system.
Then we can assume the distinguisher D is a unitary operation D on the
output and auxiliary qubits, followed by a measurement on a specific output
qubit. So we can write D(ρ) = trR(D(ρ⊗|0〉 〈0|)D†), where |0〉 〈0| stands for big
enough auxiliary qubits. Let’s use Eproj(ρ) to denote the operation of projecting
ρ onto the computational basis. Denote the projection operator onto the |0〉 〈0|
space as P0, we have
Adv
qIND−CPA
GBC (A , κ) (13)
=|Pr(D(EK GBC.EncK(ϕ)) = 1))− Pr(D(EK GBC.EncK(0
N )) = 1)| (14)
≤|Pr(D(EK ER(ρ)) = 1))− Pr(D(EK ER(Eproj(ρ))) = 1)|+
|Pr(D(EK GBC.EncK(Eproj(ϕ))) = 1))− Pr(D(EK GBC.EncK(0
N )) = 1)|
(15)
Here we write ρ := (EtK ⊗ I)(ϕ) ⊗ TAB(K,R).
Let’s first compute the first term.
|Pr(D(EK ER(ρ)) = 1))− Pr(D(EK ER(Eproj(ρ))) = 1))| (16)
=| tr(P0(EK ERD(ρ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)D
†))− tr(P0(EK ERD(Eproj(ρ)⊗ |0〉 〈0|)D†))|
(17)
The first term inside can be expanded as
EK ERD(ρ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)D
† (18)
=EK ERD((EtK ⊗ I)(ϕ) ⊗ TAB(K,R)⊗ |0〉 〈0|)D
† (19)
=EK ERD((EtK ⊗ I)((
∑
i
ci |i〉 |ϕi〉)(
∑
i
c†i 〈i| 〈ϕi|))
(EtK ⊗ I)
† ⊗ TAB(K,R)⊗ |0〉 〈0|)D† (20)
Denote |xi〉 = EtK |i〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉, we can simplify the expression:
(20) =EK ERD(
∑
i
ci |xi〉
∑
i
c†i 〈xi| ⊗ TAB(K,R)⊗ |0〉 〈0|)D
† (21)
=EK ERD(
∑
i
|ci|
2 |xi〉 〈xi| ⊗ TAB(K,R)⊗ |0〉 〈0|)D
†
+ EK ERD(
∑
i6=j
cic
†
j |xi〉 〈xj | ⊗ TAB(K,R)⊗ |0〉 〈0|)D
† (22)
=EK ERD(Eproj(ρ)⊗ |0〉 〈0|)D
†
+ EK ERD(
∑
i6=j
cic
†
j |xi〉 〈xj | ⊗ TAB(K,R)⊗ |0〉 〈0|)D
† (23)
Substitute it into (17), we get
(17)
=|EK ER tr(P0D(
∑
i6=j
cic
†
j |xi〉 〈xj | ⊗ TAB(K,R)⊗ |0〉 〈0|)D
†)| (24)
=|
∑
i6=j
cic
†
j EK ER(〈xj | 〈TAB(K,R)| 〈0|D
†P0D(|xi〉 |TAB(K,R)〉 |0〉)| (25)
≤
√∑
i6=j
c2i c
†
j
2
√∑
i6=j
|EK ER 〈0| 〈TAB(K,R)| 〈xj |D†P0D |xi〉 ⊗ |TAB(K,R)〉 |0〉 |2
(26)
≤
√∑
i6=j
EK ER |(〈0| ⊗ 〈TAB(K,R)| 〈xj |)D†P0D(|xi〉 ⊗ |TAB(K,R)〉 |0〉)|2 (27)
The magic of this technique actually happens between (24) and (25): first we
move
∑
i6=j cic
†
j out by linearity, then after rotating terms inside the trace, an
expression which talks about applying D on some state becomes an expression
for the probability of applying {D†P0D,D†P1D} on |xi〉 and getting |xj〉.
By Lemma 2, consider the operation E defined as follows: expand the space
and apply D, make a measurement with operators {P0, P1}, and apply D
†. Let
E0 = D†P0D(· ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)D†P0D, and E1 = D†P1D(· ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)D†P1D. We have:
EK ER(tr((EtK |j〉)
†E0(EtK(i)⊗ ϕi ⊗ TAB(K,R))EtK |j〉)) (28)
+ tr((EtK |j〉)
†E1(EtK(|i〉 〈i|)⊗ ϕi ⊗ TAB(K,R))EtK |j〉)) (29)
≤poly(q,N, L)2−0.5κ (30)
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With this, we can bound the inner part of (27) further:
EK ER |(〈0| ⊗ 〈TAB(K,R)| 〈xj |)D
†P0D(|xi〉 ⊗ |TAB(K,R)〉 |0〉)|2 (31)
=EK ER |(〈0| ⊗ 〈TAB(K,R)| (EtK |j〉)⊗ |ϕj〉)
†
D†P0D(EtK |i〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉)⊗ |TAB(K,R)〉 |0〉)|2 (32)
≤EK ER tr((EtK |j〉)
†E0(EtK(|i〉 〈i|)⊗ ϕi ⊗ TAB(K,R)⊗ |0〉 〈0|)EtK |j〉) (33)
≤poly(q,N, L)2−0.5κ (34)
Substitute it back into (27), we will know
|Pr(D(EK ER(ρ)) = 1)− Pr(D(EK ER(Eproj(ρ))) = 1)| (35)
≤2Nqpoly(q,N, L)2−0.25κ (36)
The second term in (15) can be bounded by Proposition 2. Eproj(ρ) is a classical
state so we have
|Pr(D(EK GBC.EncK(Eproj(ϕ))) = 1)− Pr(D(EK GBC.EncK(0
N)) = 1)|
≤poly(q,N, L)2−κ
Combining these two inequalities we have
Adv
qIND−CPA
GBC (A , κ) ≤ poly(q,N, L)2
−0.25(κ−4Nq)
6.4 Standard Model
In the last section we prove the security in the quantum random oracle model.
In practice, the random oracle can usually be replaced with hash functions, and
we claim that our protocol is not an exception (Conjecture 4). In our protocol,
it’s more natural to use a symmetric key encryption scheme directly: the usage
of the random oracle in our protocol is on the verifiable symmetric multi-key
encryption scheme, and the verification can be replaced with the ”point-and-
permute” technique from the classical garbled circuit.
When using symmetric key encryption instead of the random oracle, since in
our protocol we use affine functions in KDM game, we need at least that the sym-
metric key encryption is secure against quantum adversaries under KDM game
for affine functions. Although this is a strong assumption, it’s still reasonable in
practice.
7 Applications
7.1 Blind Quantum Computation for C+P Circuits
Protocol 1 is a quantum computation delegation protocol. But since the circuit
can be put into inputs, we can turn it into a blind quantum computation protocol,
where the server doesn’t know either input state or the circuit to be applied.
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If we only want to hide the type of gates in the circuit, our original protocol
actually already achieves it. But if we also want to hide the circuit topology, we
need to do more. The adversaries should only know the fact that the circuit is
a C+P circuit, the input size and an upper bound on the circuit size. In this
subsection we are going to construct a universal machine U such that for all the
C+P circuit C, C(ρ) = U(C, ρ). What’s more, we want U to be in C+P so that
we can use our protocol on U .
Suppose the size of input is N and the phase gates are all in the form of
RZ(π/2
d), d ∈ [D]. Then there are N3 + ND possible choices for each gate.
Thus a log(N3+ND) bits description is enough for each gate. For the server-side
evaluation, a bad implementation may lead to N3 +ND extra cost, and we can
do a simple preprocessing on the circuit to reduce it: We can first introduce three
auxiliary wires, and convert C to a form that only contains three types of gates:
(1)RZ(π/2
d) (2)a SWAP operation between a normal wire and an auxiliary wire
(3)a Toffoli gate on the auxiliary wires. After this transformation, the number
of choices of the gates is only 3N + 1 + ND. Thus we can describe each gate
by a string of length log(3N + 1 + ND). And given the description of g, the
operation of U is a series of multi-controlled gate operations, where the control
wires correspond to the gate description and the target wires are the wires in
the original circuit. And this multi-controlled multi-target operation is also in
C+P and it can be transformed to the standard form of Toffoli and phase gates.
Since U itself is a C+P circuit, we can delegate it by applying Protocol 1.
Then the original circuit will be indistinguishable from the identity circuit, which
means we know nothing beyond some information on its size.
7.2 Adding Interactions
Our protocol naturally implies an interactive protocol for delegation of universal
quantum circuits whose complexity depends on the H depth. This is different
from several previous protocols, for example, [7], where the number of interac-
tions is linear to the T depth. [20] discussed the H depth of quantum circuits,
and introduced the concept of ”Fourier Hierarchy”(FH). So we get
Theorem 7. For circuits in FHk+1, there exists a quantum computation del-
egation protocol such that it’s secure in the quantum random oracle model, the
client side quantum resources are O(kκNq) CNOT gates(assuming Conjecture
3, κ = η, or under current security proof, κ = η + 4Nq), and O(k) rounds of
interactions.
Every time the circuits meet an H layer, the server can send the whole state
back, then the client decrypts, applies H and encrypts again, and sends it to the
server and the protocol continues. The number of interactions is linear to the H
depth.
Usually, the security proof for an interactive protocol can be harder than
a non-interactive protocol. But in this protocol, the client can get the whole
computation result and re-encrypt it with fresh new keys, so its security can
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be based on the security of the single round protocol in the honest-but-curious
setting.
7.3 Delegation of Shor’s Algorithm
Shor’s algorithm contains two parts: first we apply lots of Toffoli gates on |+〉⊗n⊗
|M〉, where M is, for example, the number to be factored, and n = logM ; then
measure, apply quantum Fourier transform and measure again. From [10][18] we
know the quantum Fourier transform is actually easy to implement: a quantum
Fourier transform on n qubits has time complexity O˜(n). The main burden of
Shor’s algorithm is the Toffoli part. ([18] contains resource estimates on the
elliptic curve version.) With this protocol we can let the server do the Toffoli
part of Shor’s algorithm without revealing the actual value of the input.
Explicitly, suppose the client wants to run Shor’s algorithm on M while also
wants to keep M secret, the client can use the following protocol:
Protocol 6 Protocol for delegation of Shor’s algorithm:
Suppose ShorToff is the Toffoli gate part of Shor’s algorithm, and its length
is L.
1. The client samples K ← GBC.KeyGen(1κ, 12n, 1L). Then the client prepares
(ρ, tab)← GBC.EncShorToffK (|+〉
⊗n ⊗ |M〉) and sends it to the server.
2. The server evaluates GBCCL.Eval
ShorToff(ρ, tab) and sends it back to the client.
3. The client decrypts with GBC.DecK . Then it does quantum Fourier transform
itself and measures to get the final result.
So the quantum resources on the client side are only O(κn) CNOT gates plus
O˜(n) gates for quantum Fourier transform, and it can delegate Shor’s algorithm
to the server side securely.
Theorem 8. Protocol 6 can be used to delegate Shor’s algorithm securely and
non-interactively, in the quantum random oracle model(without assuming trap-
door one-way functions), and for n bit inputs, the amount of quantum resources
on the client side are quasi-linear quantum gates plus O(κn) CNOT gates (as-
suming Conjecture 3, κ = η, or under the current security proof, κ = η + 4n).
For comparison, if the client runs Shor’s algorithm locally, the client needs to
perform ω(n2 logn) Toffoli gates, and the exact form depends on the multipli-
cation method it uses. Schoolbook multiplication leads to O(n3) complexity; if
it uses fast multiplication method, the complexity is still ω(n2 logn) and it has
a big hidden constant.
8 Quantum KDM Security
As a natural generalization of our discussion of KDM-security, we formalize the
quantum KDM security and construct a protocol in this section. Previously when
we discuss the KDM security the function f and message m are classical; here
we further generalize them to include quantum states and operations.
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Definition 9. A symmetric key non-adaptive quantum KDM game naSymQKDM
for function family F in the quantum random oracle model is defined as follows:
1. The challenger chooses bit b ←r {0, 1} and samples K = {ski}Ni=1, ski ←
KeyGen(1κ).
2. The adversary and the challenger repeat the following for L times,non-adaptively,
in other words, the challenger should only sends out the answers in step (b)
after it receives all the queries:
(a) The adversary picks index i, function f ∈ F and message ρ ∈ D(R⊗M),
and sends system M to the challenger.
(b) If b = 1, the challenger returns c = Encski(f(K, ρm)) to the adversary.
If b = 0, the challenger returns c = Encski(0
|f(K,ρm)|).
3. The adversary tries to guess b with some distinguisher D, and outputs b′.
Note that F can be quantum operations and can query the random oracle with
quantum states. The output of functions in F should be fixed-lengthed, otherwise
|f(K,m)| will not be well-defined.
The guessing advantage is defined as AdvnaSymQKDM (A , κ) = |Pr(b′ =
1|b = 1)− Pr(b′ = 1|b = 0)|
Definition 10. A symmetric key quantum encryption scheme is nonadaptively
qKDM-CPA secure for function F if for any BQP adversary A ,
Adv
naSymQKDM
F (A , κ) = negl(κ)
8.1 Protocol Design
Protocol 7 A Quantum KDM Secure Protocol in the Quantum Random Oracle
Model:
Key Generation QKDM.KeyGen(1κ): sk ← {0, 1}κ.
Encryption QKDM.Encsk(ρ): Sample a, b ∈r {0, 1}N , where N is the length of
inputs.
Output (XaZb(ρ),KDMP.Encsk(a, b)).
Decryption QKDM.Decsk((ρ, c)): First compute a, b ← KDMP.Decsk(c), then
output XaZb(ρ)
Theorem 9. Protocol 8.1 is nonadaptively qKDM-CPA secure for functions in
F [poly] in the quantum random oracle model, where F [poly] is the function family
that makes at most poly(κ) queries to the quantum random oracle.
We put its proof in the appendix.
9 Open Problems
One obvious open problem in our paper is to prove Conjecture 3, the qIND-CPA
security without additional requirement on κ. We believe this is true, but we can
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only prove the security when κ−4Nq = η. And another further research direction
is to base these protocols directly on the assumptions in the standard model, for
example, the existence of hash functions or symmetric key encryption schemes
that are exponentially KDM secure for affine functions against a quantum ad-
versary. We can also study how to optimize this protocol, and how efficient it is
compared to other protocols based on the quantum one-time pad. One obvious
route is to make use of the optimization techniques for classical garbled circuits.
Another open question is whether this protocol is useful in other prob-
lems than Shor’s algorithm. Lots of previous works studied quantum circuits
on {Clifford,T} gate set, and our work shows {C+P,H} is also important and
worth studying. There are not many works on converting quantum circuits into
layers of C+P gates and H gates, and it’s possible that some famous quantum
algorithms which require a lot of T gates, after converted into {C+P,H} gate set,
can have small H depth. This problem is still quite open, and further research is
needed here.
What’s more, KDM security in quantum settings is an interesting problem.
This paper gives some initial study on it, but there are still a lot of open ques-
tions. Is it possible to construct quantum KDM secure protocol in the stan-
dard model? Could quantum cryptography help us design classical KDM secure
scheme?Again, further research is needed here.
This paper also gives some new ideas on constructing secure quantum encryp-
tion schemes without using trapdoor functions. Although there is some result[24]
on the limit of information-theoretically secure quantum homomorphic encryp-
tion, in our work we use the quantum random oracle and make the circuits
available to the client, the limit doesn’t hold any more. So here comes lots of
interesting problems on the possibility and impossibility of quantum computa-
tion delegation: What is the limit for non-interactive information-theoretically
secure delegation of quantum computation, where the circuit is public/private,
with/without quantum ROM? If we allow small amount of quantum/classical
communication, does it lead to something different?
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Supplementary Materials
A Missing Proofs
A.1 Missing Proofs in Section 3 to 5
Proof (of Lemma 1). Let’s first consider the encryption of one qubit. Suppose
the input is |φSR〉 = α |0〉 |ϕ0〉+ β |1〉 |ϕ1〉, and we apply Et on the first register.
The lemma holds since:
1
2κ(2κ − 1)
∑
k0,k1∈{0,1}κ,k0 6=k1
(EtSk0,k1 ⊗ I
R)(φ) (37)
=
1
2κ(2κ − 1)
∑
k0,k1∈{0,1}κ,k0 6=k1
(α |k0〉 |ϕ0〉+ β |k1〉 |ϕ1〉)(α
† 〈k0| 〈ϕ0|+ β† 〈k1| 〈ϕ1|)
(38)
=(
1
2κ
I)⊗ (|α|2ϕ0 + |β|
2ϕ1)
+
1
2κ − 1
(|Φ〉 〈Φ| −
1
2κ
I)⊗ (α†β |ϕ1〉 〈ϕ0|+ αβ† |ϕ0〉 〈ϕ1|) (39)
where |Φ〉 = ( 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉))⊗κ.
The first term can be written as 12κ I⊗ trS(φ). Which means
∆((EtSk0,k1 ⊗ I
R)(φ),
1
2κ
I⊗ trS(φ)) ≤ (
1
2
)κ−4
Using this inequality on all the encrypted qubits completes the proof.
Proof (of Proposition 1). First, any diagonal gate can be decomposed to Toffoli
gates and single qubit phase gates. For RZ(θ), expand θ on π/2
d, d = 1, · · ·D
will complete the proof.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of optimality of Grover’s algorithm,
which can be found in [25]. But we need to make some revisions which are
necessary for this problem.
First, we notice that the key tags can also be seen as part of the ciphertexts,
where the messages to be encrypted are 0∗. So we can prove this theorem without
considering the key tags, and we need to redefine T as 2T . This won’t affect the
final result since 2 can be absorbed into the poly function.
After getting the ciphertexts from the encryption phase, the adversary will
use some distinguisher D to distinguish the states and compute b′. By expanding
the space, we can assume the distinguisher D is a measurement of a specific out-
put qubit after applying a unitary transform O on the ciphertexts and auxiliary
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qubits. O can be written as O = UqHqUq−1 · · ·H1U0, where Hi means ith query
to the quantum random oracle.
Furthermore, suppose the secret keys generated by the key generator areK =
{ski}Li=1, and R is the set of all the randomness in the encryption phase(including
the random paddings and the random outputs from the random oracle). Let cK,R
denote the ciphertexts that the adversary gets in the naSymKDM game when
b = 1, and eK,R denote the ciphertexts when b = 0. Then what we need to prove
can be rewritten as
Adv
naSymKDM
KDMP,F [q′] (A(L,T,q), κ) (40)
= tr(P0(EK ER(O(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)O
†)
− EK ER(O(|eK,R〉 〈eK,R| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)O
†))) (41)
≤
1
2
|EK ER(O(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)O
†)− EK ER(O(|eK,R〉 〈eK,R| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)O†)|tr
(42)
Where |0〉 〈0| can be very large system.
Suppose H′ is a new random oracle, which is independently random of H
on inputs that contain a prefix in K, and behaves the same as H otherwise.
Notice that if we can replace the random oracle queries in O with H′, since the
challenger uses H(sk||·) for encryption, the messages will be hidden and won’t
be distinguished.
Define Oi = UqHqUq−1 · · ·Hi+1UiH′iUi−1 · · · H
′
1U0. So O = O0. Define
φi = ER(Oi(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)O
†
i ) (43)
ψi = ER(Oi(|eK,R〉 〈eK,R| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)O
†
i ) (44)
So
Adv
naSymKDM
KDMP,F [q′] (A(L,T,q), κ) (45)
=
1
2
|EK(φ
0 − ψ0)|tr (46)
≤
1
2
(|EK(φ
0 − φq)|tr + |EK(φ
q − ψq)|tr + |EK(ψ
0 − ψq)|tr) (47)
Let’s first estimate |EK(φq−ψq)|tr. First by dividing the randomness R into R′,
which is the randomness of H′, and RK||, which is the randomness of H(sk||·)
together with the random paddings. We can see
|EK(φ
q −ψq)|tr = |EK ER′ Oi(ERK||(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R| − |eK,R〉 〈eK,R|))O
†
i )|tr (48)
The components of |cK,R〉 have form (Ri,H(sk||Ri)⊕m). We can’t say the ran-
domness in RK|| hides everything in m since the computation of m = f(K,msg)
may also contains some random oracle queries. But the random oracle queries of
f are all in classical states so the probability that sk||Ri does not appear before
can be bounded. Denote the queries to the random oracle inside the circuit of f
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as Q. Define bad as one of the following two events: (1) for some i, ski||Ri ∈ Q;
(2) the set of ski||Ri contains repetitions. And define good as the complement
of bad.
|ERK||(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R| − |eK,R〉 〈eK,R|)|tr (49)
=|Pr(bad)ERK||(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R| |bad) + Pr(good)ERK||(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R| |good) (50)
− Pr(bad)ERK||(|eK,R〉 〈eK,R| |bad)− Pr(good)ERK||(|eK,R〉 〈eK,R| |good)|tr
(51)
=|Pr(bad)ERK||(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R| |bad)− Pr(bad)ERK||(|eK,R〉 〈eK,R| |bad)|tr (52)
≤2Pr(bad) (53)
≤4T 2(q′ + 2)2−κ (54)
(51) to (52) is because when sk||Ri does not appear in any other places of the
random oracle queries, we can take average on the randomness of H(sk||Ri) and
the distribution of H(sk||Ri)⊕ 0 will be the same as H(sk||Ri)⊕m.
Substitute it back into (48) we will know
|EK(φ
q − ψq)|tr ≤ 4T
2(q′ + 2)2−κ (55)
And we have:
|φ0 − φq|tr (56)
≤
∑
i
|φi − φi−1|tr (57)
≤
∑
i
ER |((Hi −H
′
i)Vi(|cK,R〉 ⊗ |0〉))| (Vi := UiH
′
i−1Ui−1 · · · H
′
1U0) (58)
≤
∑
i
ER 2
√
tr(PKVi(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V
†
i ) (59)
≤2
∑
i
√
ER tr(PK(Vi(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V
†
i ))) (60)
≤2
√
q
∑
i
tr(PK(ER′(Vi(ERK||(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R|)⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V
†
i ))) (61)
≤2
√
q
∑
i
(tr(PK(ER′(Vi(ERK||(|eK,R〉 〈eK,R|)⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V
†
i ))) + 4T
2(q′ + 2)2−κ)
(62)
Where the last step is by (49)-(54).
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And when we take the expectation on K, we have
EK |φ
0 − φq|tr (63)
≤
√
EK |φ0 − φq|2tr (64)
≤
√
4qEK
∑
i
(tr(PK(ER′(Vi(ERK||(|eK,R〉 〈eK,R|)⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V
†
i ))) + 2T (q
′ + T )2−κ)
(65)
≤
√
(4q(qL+ 4T 2(q′ + 2)))2−κ (66)
(65) to (66) is because the inner part is the same for different K so we can take
average on PK .
Similarly we have
EK |ψ
0 − ψq|tr ≤
√
(4q(qL+ 4T 2(q′ + 2)))2−κ (67)
Substitute (55)(66)(67) into (47), we have
Adv
naSymKDM
KDMP,F [q′] (A(L,T,q), κ) ≤ 2
√
(4q(qL+ 4T 2(q′ + 2)))2−κ + 4T 2(q′ + 2)2−κ
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
First, let’s prove a lemma. To handle the case that there are some revealed keys
in the GBC game, we introduce the following game, which we called ”rG” game,
which is the starting point of our proof, and whose security can be proved from
Theorem 5.
Lemma 3. Let’s first define an intermediate game for CL. Let’s call restricted
game rG, with parameters (N,L, J, q), κ:
1. The challenger chooses bit b← {0, 1} and samples (ski)Li=1, ski ← KeyGen(1
κ)
2. The adversary picks (1)a set of pairs P = {(Sj , Tj)}
J
j=1, where Sj , Tj are all
tuples of indexes, ∀j, Sj ⊆ [L], Tj ⊆ [L], |Sj | = |Tj | = 3 or |Sj | = 1, |Tj| =
0; (2)a sequence of messages M = (m1,m2, · · ·mJ); (3)index set Rev =
{rids}Ns=1, rids ∈ [L].
Define Closure(Rev) as the minimum set that satisfies:
(1)Rev ⊆ Closure(Rev); (2)∀(Sj , Tj) ∈ P , if Sj ⊆ Closure(Rev), then
Tj ⊆ Closure(Rev).
3. The challenger sends a set of secret keys {skrid}, rid ∈ Rev to the adversary.
And for all i ∈ [J ], the challenger also sends:
CL.EncskSi (skTi ||mi), if b = 1 or Si ⊆ Closure(Rev) (68)
CL.EncskSi (0
|skTi ||mi|), otherwise (69)
Here we use skSi as the abbreviation of the three keys used for the encryption
whose indexes are in Si, and use skTi to denote the concatenation of keys
whose indexes are in Ti.
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4. The adversary tries to guess b with some distinguisher D, which will query
the random oracle(either in classical or quantum states) q times.
The guess advantage is defined as AdvrGCL (A(N,L,J,q), κ) = |Pr(b
′ = 1|b = 1) −
Pr(b′ = 1|b = 0)|.
We have AdvrGCL (A(N,L,J,q), κ) = poly(q, L, J)2
−0.5κ, where poly is a polyno-
mial that does not depend on A or the parameters.
The proof is based on Theorem 5 and is postponed to the next subsection of the
appendix.
Now we can prove Proposition 2 from Lemma 3.
Proof (of Proposition 2). Note that, what the adversary gets in this game is
already very similar to the ciphertexts in Protocol 1 when the input is classical.
So with an adversary for IND-CPA game for GBCCCL with parameters (N,L, q), κ,
which will choose |i〉 〈i| as input and use D as the distinguisher, we can design
an adversary for rG with parameters (N, 3L, 16L, q), κ in this way:
1. A key set K = (klb) is sampled. Let’s reindex the keys with [3L]. Choose
Revi to be the set of indexes of keys revealed in EncK(i), where i is the
input string to the IND-CPA game of GBC.
2. Choose PC and MC corresponding to circuit C. Explicitly, each element of
PC corresponds to a row in garbled tables, and for each row in the form
of CL.Enck1,k2,k3(sk), it corresponds to an index i such that Si contains the
indexes of k1, k2, k3, and Ti is the indexes of sk, mi is empty. And for each
row in the form of CL.Enck(m), Si contains the index of k, andm ismi ∈MC ,
Ti = ∅.
and define Shuffle as the operation that arranges these ciphertexts into the cor-
responding places in garbled tables and shuffles each table randomly. Explicitly,
let’s use OraclerGb (PC ,MC) as the output of the rG game in the third step, taking
average on all the randomness. Then we have
TABCCL(K) = EM Shuffle(Oracle
rG
b=1(PC ,MC))
GBCCCL.EncK(i) = KRevi ⊗ TAB
C
CL(K)
GBCCCL.EncK(0
N ) = KRev0 ⊗ TAB
C
CL(K)
This means if we have an adversary which can distinguish EK GBC.EncK(i) and
EK GBC.EncK(0
N ) by some distinguisher D, we can design an adversary for rG
by first choosing the corresponding P,Rev,M and get KRev ⊗Oracle
rG
b=1(P,M),
apply Shuffle and then use D to distinguish the two cases. Explicitly, by Lemma
3, when the input is i:
|Pr(D(EK(KRevi ⊗ Shuffle(Oracle
rG
b=0(PC ,MC)) = 1)))
− Pr(D(EK(KRevi ⊗ Shuffle(Oracle
rG
b=1(PC ,MC)))) = 1)| (70)
=AdvrGCL (A
′
(N,6L,16L,q), κ) (71)
≤poly(q,N, L)2−0.5κ (72)
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When the input is 0:
|Pr(D(EK(KRev0 ⊗ Shuffle(Oracle
rG
b=0(PC ,MC)) = 1)))
− Pr(D(EK(KRev0 ⊗ Shuffle(Oracle
rG
b=1(PC ,MC)) = 1)))| (73)
=AdvrGCL (A
′′
(N,6L,16L,q), κ) (74)
≤poly(q,N, L)2−0.5κ (75)
And after shuffling the tables and taking average on all the possible keys we have
|EK EM (KRevi ⊗ Shuffle(Oracle
rG
b=0(PC ,MC)))
− EK EM (KRev0 ⊗ Shuffle(Oracle
rG
b=0(PC ,MC)))|tr = 0 (76)
This is because the keys and the m for phase gates are all chosen randomly.
Notice that we need to take average on the choices of MC here.
And this implies
AdvIND−CPAGBCCL (A , κ) (77)
=|Pr(D(EK GBC.EncK(i)) = 1))− Pr(D(EK GBC.EncK(0
N)) = 1)| (78)
=|Pr(D(EK(KRevi ⊗ EM Shuffle(Oracle
rG
b=1(PC ,MC)) = 1)))
− Pr(D(EK(KRev0 ⊗ EM Shuffle(Oracle
rG
b=1(PC ,MC)))) = 1)| (79)
≤|EK EM (KRevi ⊗ Shuffle(Oracle
rG
b=0(PC ,MC)))
− EK EM (KRev0 ⊗ Shuffle(Oracle
rG
b=0(PC ,MC)))|tr
+ EM |Pr(D(EK(KRev0 ⊗ Shuffle(Oracle
rG
b=0(PC ,MC)))) = 1)−
Pr(D(EK(KRev0 ⊗ Shuffle(Oracle
rG
b=1(PC ,MC)))) = 1)|
+ EM |Pr(D(EK(KRevi ⊗ Shuffle(Oracle
rG
b=0(PC ,MC)))) = 1)−
Pr(D(EK(KRevi ⊗ Shuffle(Oracle
rG
b=1(PC ,MC)))) = 1)| (80)
≤poly(N,L, q)2−0.5κ (81)
Where the last step is by (72)(75)(76).
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. First, let’s give an estimate for AdvrGCL (A , κ). Notice that the construction
of multi-key encryption CL is the same as cascading encryption
Enck1(Enck2(Enck3(m))), where Enck(m) = (R,H(k||R)⊕m). And we can view
the inner Enc as part of KDM function f ∈ F [q′ = 2]. What’s more, the key tags
can be obtained by encrypting 0∗ with the corresponding keys. So an adversary
A for rG game with parameters κ, (N,L, J, q) can be used to design an adversary
A ′ for naSymKDM game for function family F [q′ = 2] with parameters κ, (L, J+
L, q) as follows:
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1. In the step 1 of naSymKDM game, K = {ski}Li=1 is sampled. The adversary
simulates an rG game, and samples K ′ = {sk′i}
L
i=1.
The step 2(a) of naSymKDM game is done by the adversary. The adver-
sary first runs the step 2 of rG game. Suppose what the adversary picks
are P,R,M . Denote |Closure(Rev)| = L1, L − |Closure(Rev)| = L2. The
adversary in rG game will regard {ski}
L2
i=1 ∪ {sk
′
i}
L1
i=1 as the keys sampled
in the first step in rG game by the challenger.
2. Then the adversary in rG goes to step 3. It will get a set of ciphertexts
from the challenger in rG. Notice that what the adversary gets in rG can be
simulated with naSymKDM game as follows:
(a) For i ∈ [J ], suppose Si = (a, b, c). If a /∈ Closure(Rev), query KDMP.Enc
on f(K,m) = Encskb(Encskc(skTi ||mi)) under ska. If k1 ∈ Closure(Rev)
but k2 /∈ Closure(Rev), query on f = Encskc(skTi ||mi) under skb. If
k1, k2 ∈ Closure(Rev) but k3 /∈ Closure(Rev), query on skTi ||m under
skc. If all the three indexes are in Closure(Rev), skip this query.
Then for each key tag in the form of (Ri,H(ski||Ri)), query the encryp-
tion of 0 under ski.
(b) In step 2(b) of naSymKDM game, A ′ gets a list of ciphertexts. For
i ∈ [|J |], suppose Si = (a, b, c). Suppose c is the ciphertext corresponding
to Si that the adversary gets in step 2(if there is). If a /∈ Closure(Rev),
assign c′ = c. If k1 ∈ Closure(Rev) but k2 /∈ Closure(Rev), assign
c′ = Encsk′a(c). If k1, k2 ∈ Closure(Rev) but k3 /∈ Closure(Rev), assign
c′ = Encsk′a(Encsk′b (c)). If all the three indexes are in Closure(R), assign
c′ = Encsk′a(Encsk′b (Encskc(skTi ||mi))). Store this c
′ into a list.
3. Use the distinguisher of rG game on the list of c′ that the adversary gets in
the last step. Suppose the result is b′. Output b′ as the distinguishing output
in naSymKDM game.
So from the security of KDM protocol we know
AdvrGCL (A(N,L,J,q), κ) ≤ Adv
naSymKDM
KDMP,F [q′=2](A(L,J+N,q), κ) ≤ poly(q, L, J)2
−0.5κ
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. For any operation D, i 6= j, |ϕj〉,
p = EK ER tr((EtK |j〉)
†D(EtK(|i〉 〈i|)⊗ ϕi ⊗ TAB(K,R))(EtK |j〉)
is the probability that the input is EtK |i〉 and the output is EtK |j〉. But since
EtK |i〉 is a classical state we can make one copy of it and in the end we will
know both from D with this probability.
Let’s use it to design an adversary A for the rG game of CL:
1. The adversary picks |i〉⊗|ϕj〉 as the input and PC ,MC defined as the proof of
Proposition 2. Then the adversary will get EtK |i〉⊗|ϕi〉⊗Oracle
rG
b (PC ,MC)
from the challenger in the rG game.
2. Then the adversary applies the distinguisher D′ defined as follows:
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(a) The adversary makes a copy of the outputs and applies ShuffleC to get
TABCCL(K) = Shuffle
C(OraclerGb (PC ,MC)). Then it gets
EtK |i〉 ⊗ Oracle
rG
b (PC ,MC)⊗ EtK |i〉 ⊗ TAB
C
CL(K)⊗ |ϕi〉
Then the adversary applies D on the last three systems and measures in
the computational basis.
(b) Find a w such that i and j differ in bit w. There are two keys kw0 and
kw1 on this wire, from EtK |i〉 the adversary knows one key on wire w,
and from the last step the adversary gets some result which might be
EtK |j〉(with some probability), from which it can get another key on
w. Then the adversary verifies whether this value is another key with
the key verification information in OraclerGb (PC ,MC). If the verification
passes, output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
By the rG game security we have
AdvrGGBCCL(A(N,6L,16L,q+1), κ) (82)
=|Pr(D′(EtK |i〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉 ⊗ OraclerGb=1(PC ,MC)) = 1)
− Pr(D′(EtK |i〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉 ⊗ OraclerGb=0(PC ,MC)) = 1)| (83)
≤poly(N,L, q)2−0.5κ (84)
And Pr(D′(EtK |i〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉 ⊗Oracle
rG
b=0(PC ,MC)) = 1) is the probability of ”com-
pute and verify successfully”, it can be bounded by the optimality of Grover
search. Let’s analyze with more details.
Suppose in D′ we choose to compute and verify the key skwx on input wire
w. That will imply the index of skw1−x is in Rev, and the index of sk
w
x is not
in Closure(Rev). Recall that in the construction of OraclerGb=0(PC ,MC), if the
index of some key is not in Closure(Rev), and when b = 0, the Oracle will replace
the ciphertext with encryption of 0∗. So the only information related to skwx is
contained in: (1)the oracle output in the form of CL.EncSi(0
∗), skwb ∈ Si. (2) the
key verification tag in the form of CL.Encskw
b
(0∗).
Write D′ = Ver ◦ Compute, where Compute is the operation in the 2(a) of
D. Since the key tag can be very long(the output length of H is arbitrary),
the probability that skwx is not the only value that can pass the verification is
exponentially small. So conditioned on it is the only entry that can pass the
verification, we have
Pr(D′(EtK |i〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉 ⊗ OraclerGb=0(PC ,MC)) = 1) (85)
=Pr(Compute(EtK |i〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉 ⊗ Oracle
rG
b=0(PC ,MC)) = sk
w
b ) (86)
which is the probability of computing the key skwx in q queries. From the
result in [25] we know
Pr(D′(Shuffle(OraclerGb=0(PC ,MC))) = 1) = Θ(q
22−κ)
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Combining it with (84) we can get a bound on the first term in (83):
Pr(D′(EtK |i〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉 ⊗ Shuffle(OraclerGb=1(PC ,MC))) = 1) ≤ poly(N,L, q)2
−0.5κ
Return to the original problem.
EK ER tr((EtK |j〉)†D(EtK(|i〉 〈i|)⊗ϕi⊗TAB(K,R))(EtK |j〉)) is the probability
that the input is EtK(|i〉) and the output is EtK(|j〉), and when we construct D′
from D, conditioned on this event, the result will pass the verification in 2(b)
step with probability 1. That implies
EK ER tr((EtK |j〉)
†D(EtK(|i〉 〈i|)⊗ ϕi ⊗ TAB(K,R))(EtK |j〉)) (87)
≤Pr(D′(EtK |i〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉 ⊗ Shuffle(OraclerGb=1(PC ,MC))) = 1) (88)
≤poly(N,L, q)2−0.5κ (89)
A.6 Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. Explicitly, define AdvnaSymQKDMF [q′] (A(L,T,q), κ) as the advantage in the
game where the adversary is allowed to sample L keys, make T queries to the
encryption oracle, and the distinguisher is allowed to query the random oracle q
times, and the function family is F [q′].
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5. Let cK,R denote the cipher-
texts that the adversary gets in the naSymQKDM game when b = 1, and eK,R
denote the ciphertexts when b = 0. These are the same as the proof of Theorem
5. One difference here is that c and e are not necessarily classical any more,
so we need to consider c and e as the combination of the states of the cipher-
texts returned by the challenger together with the reference system kept by the
adversary. We can bound the distinguishing advantage in naSymQKDM game
following the same route as the proof of Theorem 5, and we only need to give a
new estimate for
|ERK||(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R| − |eK,R〉 〈eK,R|)|tr (90)
Here K is a fixed key set, and RK|| stands for the randomness in the random
paddings, output of H on inputs with prefix in K, and the one time pad keys.
The ciphertexts cK,R and eK,R should be viewed as the ciphertexts for all
the queries. Since we only consider non-adaptive settings, the computation of
the ciphertexts can be written as
ERK||(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R|) = ERK||(I⊗ QKDM.Enc
⊗T )(ρ)
ERK||(|eK,R〉 〈eK,R|) = ERK||(I⊗ QKDM.Enc
⊗T )(ρR ⊗ 0|M|)
Where
ρ = (I⊗O)(σmsg ⊗K ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)(I⊗O
†), ρ ∈ D(R⊗M), I operates on R
where O is a unitary operation which stands for the circuit of f ∈ F , σmsg is the
density operator of the input to f together with its reference system, and the
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system M of ρ contains the inputs to Enc in all the queries. Pay attention that
this O is different from those defined in the proof of Theorem 5: this O is the
operation of f while the O in the previous proof represents the distinguisher.
And we slightly abuse the notation: the encryption queries in QKDM.Enc⊗T
actually don’t use the same keys.
Once we get a bound for (90), we can substitute it into (61)-(62) and then
we will get a new bound for (66), and similarly substitute the new bound for
(55)(66)(67) into (47) will give us the naSymQKDM advantage we need.
O can be written as O = UqHqUq−1 · · · H1U0. Suppose Q is the set of queries
to the random oracle when applying KDMP.Enc, and since we have already fixed
the keys, the randomness comes from the random paddings. Suppose RQ is the
randomness of H on the queries in Q. Let Rab denote the randomness from the
choices of one time pad keys. Then we have
|ERK||(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R|)− ERK||(|eK,R〉 〈eK,R|)|tr (91)
=|EQ ERQ ERab(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R|)− EQ ERQ ERab(|eK,R〉 〈eK,R|)|tr (92)
First consider a fixed Q. Let H′′ be a quantum random oracle that is indepen-
dently random from H on entries in Q. Use R′ to denote the randomness in H′′.
And let
Oi = UqHqUq−1 · · · Hi+1UiH′′i Ui−1 · · ·H
′′U0
Define
ψi = ER′(I⊗ QKDM.Enc
⊗T )((I ⊗Oi)(σmsg ⊗K ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)(I⊗O
†
i ))
Note that this is not the same ψ as defined in (44). Then we have
|ERK||(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R|)− ERK||(|eK,R〉 〈eK,R|)|tr (93)
≤|EQ ERQ ERab(ψ
0)− EQ ERQ ERab(ψ
q)|tr (94)
+ EQ |ERQ ERab(ψ
q)− ERQ ER′ ERab(|eK,R〉 〈eK,R|)|tr (95)
And by the same technique as (57)-(61) we have
|ψ0 − ψq|tr (96)
≤
∑
i
|ψi − ψi−1|tr (97)
≤2
√
q′
∑
i
tr(PQ(ER′(Vi(σmsg ⊗K ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V
†
i ))) (Vi := UiH
′′
i−1Ui−1 · · · H
′′
1U0)
(98)
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Which means
|EQ ERQ ERab(ψ
0)− EQ ERQ ERab(ψ
q)|tr (99)
≤2EQ ERQ
√
q′
∑
i
tr(PQ(ER′(Vi(σmsg ⊗K ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V
†
i ))) (100)
≤2
√
q′
∑
i
EQ ERQ tr(PQ(ER′(Vi(σmsg ⊗K ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)V
†
i ))) (101)
≤2
√
(q′)2T 2−κ (102)
And for the second term in (95), since the randomness of RQ is not correlated
to the plaintexts anymore, taking average on RQ will hide the one time pad keys
perfectly. Then taking average on the one time pad keys will hide ρ perfectly:
∀Q, |ERQ ERab(ψ
q)− ERQ ER′ ERab(|eK,R〉 〈eK,R|)|tr = 0 (103)
Combining (102)(95)(103), we have
|ER(|cK,R〉 〈cK,R|)− ER(|eK,R〉 〈eK,R|)|tr ≤ poly(L, T, q, q
′)2−0.5κ
Substitute it into (47)(61), we get
Adv
naSymQKDM
F [q′] (A(L,T,q), κ) ≤ poly(L, T, q, q
′)2−0.25κ
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